Pressure is an ever-present part of working pilot’s lives. Usually, they are plying their trade with a for-profit company. The underlining need to keep the books in the black is a pressure on the company operators who then push that pressure to the pilots.

A difficult part of the pilot career is balancing the pressure. They need to balance safety and the operational needs, realizing they cannot fully serve both masters. Adding to all this is the concern to make enough money for living. Sometimes, making a decision to not go means a pilot takes a pay hit.

The pressure is present in a couple forms. It causes pilots to fly airplanes that are safe but not legal. This is an odd distinction, but the FAA maintenance system is convoluted and very detailed. It is also paperwork heavy.

A frequent example of flying safe but non-legal airplanes is night-flying with a not-working light. Many types of lights are required for night flight but operators/pilots will sometimes fly an airplane on a last leg to a destination where the light can be fixed.

Less scrupulous operators will pressure pilots to fly non-safe airplanes, or will try to get pilots to fly many legs with minor systems broken. I had experience with an operator who tried convincing pilots to fly an airplane after the transponder had been removed. The transponder was sent to an avionics repair shop and the airplane was not being operated in areas requiring a transponder. However, since the part weighing all of about two pounds had been removed, the plane had to be weighed again to be legal.

I had a friend who flew for a cargo operator that blatantly disregarded FAA regulations. One of the incidents he dealt with involved the airplane wing flaps which topped working at an outstation. On that airplane type, and with the runways he would be using, the flaps weren’t necessary for safety. The operator convinced him to fly the airplane in revenue operation back to a location to be fixed. But the operator didn’t fix the flaps, and they tried to convince him to continue flying the broken airplane.

The FAA law is actually reasonable and isn’t too confusing concerning weather. Most operators do an ok job of following the letter of the weather law. It is the letter they concern themselves with though. The operational reality is left to pilots.

Allowable minimums on instrument approaches deal with surface visibility and cloud height. To legally fly an approach the surface visibility must be higher than the minimum required for that approach. Each approach also has a minimum altitude that pilots may descend to until sighting the runway. Even if the surface visibility is good pilots will not be able to land if they are stuck in low clouds. Operators will push pilots to fly an approach if the visibility is met regardless of the cloud height.

Some non-airline operators fly into airports that do not have instrument approaches. The airports must be found visually. This often means having to stay below the clouds as flying above ensures not landing. Ducking below the weather is known as scud running and it can get dangerous.

Airplane’s advantage over other travels modes is time. Airplane operations are dominated by time. There is an intense pressure to keep the schedule, or to catch up with the schedule if running late. Time makes it easier to let maintenance items slide and to push into poor weather.

Airline managers encourage rushing cultures. They provided financial incentives to employees for maintaining schedules. They sometimes reprimand employees for disrupting the schedule. And they will wink and nod for employees to look the other way on minor safety issues while professing safety as top priority. Unfortunately, managers often short staff positions as they set un-realistic schedules. The easily influenced employees rush, and they often miss things.

All is Not Lost

The airline pilot career is not pressure purgatory. Most inexperienced pilots let the pressure push them, so it can be very real in this regard. But through experience, pilots learn to relax.

I am not a fan of some FAA procedures and policies. However, one thing the FAA does well is set a culture where operators are afraid to openly push people in safety-sensitive jobs into illegal or unsafe operations. A sure way to illicit FAA wrath is for an operator to openly push employees.

As pilots gain experience they learn what is unsafe weather. They learn FAA weather limits are appropriate to modern airliner capabilities. And they learn that even though they may not get in on an approach there is a safe missed approach procedure on the other side.

Airlines have safety systems in place that backup safety critical items. If a person misses a safety-sensitive item there will be another person also checking. Even if a person is rushing and misses something as a result it will likely be caught.

Pilots learn that schedules are suggestions. They realize they should be concerned with the schedule but never driven by it. When a pilot gets used to a new position they will learn a flow and pace for their work. And they will learn to always stick with their flow and pace. Doing otherwise risks missing things. And doing otherwise makes the job stressful.

I have not seen a pilot lose their job from standing ground on a safety issue.

A Recent Pressure Experience

I was between flights in our primary maintenance base. Another airplane broke, causing us to have a last minute airplane swap. Our new airplane was taxied from the maintenance hangar, but was 20 minutes late because of confusion among the people moving the airplane.

The airplane was signed off as airworthy but it was due back into that same maintenance base that night for additional work. It was intended as a last-ditch spare and we were supposed to fly a quick out and back.

On descent and landing at our destination, we had problems with the fuel system overheating. It was a prior issue from the day before. The prior crew was able to get the fuel temperature back under limits using approved procedures. Because they were able to lower the temperature the plane was still considered airworthy. We were not able to lower the temperature.

The maintenance controller tried to keep the airplane in service using the service bulletin that had allowed the airplane to fly after the prior incident. We were told it would be applicable and that it was ok to board passengers for the return flight (we didn’t yet have access to the bulletin).

After our passengers were boarded, the maintenance controller decided to keep the airplane in service, but to use the minimum equipment list instead. He had decided, without actually testing the system, that it must be the fuel temperature gauge that was malfunctioning. We are allowed to use a minimum equipment list procedure where one gauge may be inoperative provided certain conditions are met.

This raised red flags for the captain and I. We figured there was a reason the maintenance controller was abandoning the service bulletin. And we were not comfortable deferring an indicator when the indicator had given us no signs of malfunctioning. Neither the fuel system nor the indicator had actually been checked.

We drew our line in the sand. Through the discussions we got a copy of the service bulletin and learned it could not apply. We were not happy with the maintenance controller trying disguise an indicator malfunction to get the airplane in the air. The captain eventually refused the airplane.

Unfortunately, this meant cancelling the flight and most of the passengers being inconvenienced. We did not want this, but we could not let the pressure of the situation influence our decisions.

After we had left the airplane the fuel system was addressed. It turned out there was a malfunction. On a positive note, managers are following up and are working to prevent this from happening again. But I am skeptical of anything actually happening. The maintenance controller in question does this stuff on a regular basis.